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Jack L. Knetsch (1989) reported an impor-
tant discovery. Using a simple experiment, he 
demonstrated the existence of asymmetries in 
exchange behavior. More precisely, when he 
followed a specific set of procedures to endow 
subjects with mugs and provided each subject 
an opportunity to exchange the endowed mug 
for a candy bar, he found that very few subjects 
gave up the endowed mug. By contrast, when 
he endowed a different group of subjects with 
candy bars using the same set of procedures, 
very few gave up the candy bar in exchange for 
a mug. While Knetsch, and many of those who 
followed him, interpreted the asymmetry as evi-
dence of a special shape of preferences related to 
loss aversion (Knetsch 1989, 1277), our results 
demonstrate that observed asymmetries should 
be attributed instead to well-established alter-
native economic theories that influence choices 
through the experimental procedures employed.
Knetsch’s initial intuitions have been expanded 
in a large and growing literature claiming that 
observed exchange asymmetries support “endow-
ment effect theory”—an application of prospect 
theory positing that loss aversion associated with 
an endowment leads to asymmetries in valua-
tions and exchange behavior. We use the term 
“endowment effect theory” rather than “endow-
ment effect” to avoid the confusion over termi-
nology that has emerged in the literature. From 
the beginning (i.e., Richard H. Thaler 1980), the 
label “endowment effect” has been used com-
monly to refer to observed symmetries. Using 
this label to refer to the observed phenomenon 
is problematic because it suggests a particular 
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theory as an explanation for asymmetries. To say 
that an observed phenomenon demonstrates an 
“endowment effect” does not simply denote that 
an asymmetry was observed; rather, use of the 
label implies that a very special form of prefer-
ences causes the asymmetry. We use “endow-
ment effect theory” to distinguish the theoretical 
explanation from the observed phenomenon, 
which we refer to in this narrow context as an 
“exchange asymmetry.” Specifically, endowment 
effect theory posits that individuals perceive 
parting with an endowed good as a loss that is 
greater than a potential gain from acquiring 
another good of otherwise equal value (Thaler 
1980, 44). In turn, this interpretation generates 
support for a specific theory of choice behavior 
called prospect theory, of which loss aversion is 
a major component.1
More broadly, endowment effect theory has 
been advanced to explain two completely dif-
ferent classes of phenomena that have seemed 
to defy explanation by any classical economic 
theory. First, some have argued that endowment 
effect theory explains observed gaps between 
“willingness to pay” (WTP) and “willingness to 
accept” (WTA). When asked to report the most 
one would be willing to pay for an item, the 
recorded amount tends to be lower than when 
the same person is asked to report the minimum 
amount he would be willing to accept to give up 
the item if owned. This observed phenomenon 
sparked dozens of articles over a period of 25 
years. In recent years, however, several schol-
ars have claimed that endowment effect theory 
explains observed gaps. In a review of the lit-
erature, Plott and Zeiler (2005) identify patterns 
consistent with the possible influence of experi-
mental procedures. The experimental procedures 
employed were based on special methods to 
1 Many have referred to endowment effect theory (or 
prospect theory) as the leading explanation for observed 
“endowment effects.” See, e.g., Daphne R. Raban and 
Sheizaf Rafaeli (2003); John A. List (2006); Christine M. 
Jolls (forthcoming).
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measure marginal rates of substitution. Plott and 
Zeiler (2005) posited an explanation centered on 
subject misconceptions stemming from the pref-
erence elicitation method, and ran additional 
experiments that implemented the union of 
commonly used controls to reduce misconcep-
tions. When procedures were used to eliminate 
alternative explanations, the gap disappeared. 
The data support the conclusion that observed 
WTA-WTP gaps are caused by subject miscon-
ceptions resulting from the use of special mech-
anisms required to elicit valuations. The results 
suggest that endowment effect theory cannot 
explain data from that class of experiments.
Knetsch’s (1989) results sparked a second 
body of evidence lending support to endowment 
effect theory. The simplicity of his experiments 
avoids rate of substitution measurement and thus 
avoids the complex elicitation procedures that 
Plott and Zeiler document as a possible source 
of subject misconceptions that lead to WTP-
WTA gaps. For this reason, the Plott and Zeiler 
explanation of WTP-WTA gaps—subject mis-
conceptions—does not appear to apply to the 
results derived from Knetsch’s simple design.2 
Furthermore, the simplicity of Knetsch’s design 
creates an impression that only endowment 
effect theory can account for observed asym-
metries. Consequently, investigations of asym-
metries have shifted away from the methods by 
which choices are elicited and toward a particu-
lar theory of preferences and conjectures about 
how the nature of different goods influences 
choices. The results from our study suggest that 
such diversions are premature.
The purpose of this study is to test an alter-
native explanation for observed asymmetries 
against endowment effect theory. Specifically, 
2 The procedures used in the Knetsch exchange experi-
ment are completely different from the procedures used in 
WTP-WTA experiments. When subjects are asked to report 
WTP and WTA, the gap appears to be related to the use 
of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) method of elicit-
ing preferences (see Plott and Zeiler 2005). Misconceptions 
related to the method through which incentives are 
expressed and the role of the random mechanism demon-
strated by Plott and Zeiler (2005) have little or nothing 
to do with the exchange procedure used in the Knetsch 
experiments. Thus, aside from the fact that experimental 
procedures are important in both cases, explanations for the 
WTP-WTA gap are unrelated to explanations for exchange 
asymmetries reported by Knetsch.
the alternative theory posits that asymmetries 
reflect the operation of classical preference 
theory together with well-established variations 
of classical theory operating through specific 
experimental procedures. For example, signal-
ing theories suggest that experimenter choice of 
which good to endow might influence choices 
if subjects interpret the experimenter’s choice 
as a signal of relative quality. Theories of other-
regarding preferences suggest that asymmetries 
of choice unrelated to the value of the goods 
might occur if subjects feel obliged to avoid 
rejecting a good perceived as a gift from the 
experimenter. In addition, information aggrega-
tion and cascade theories suggest that the public 
nature of choice revelation allows for the pos-
sibility that choices depend on other subjects’ 
choices. To control for these alternative expla-
nations, we alter the procedures to rule out as 
many procedurally based theories as possible.
Given the nature of laboratory methodology, 
one might wonder whether our results are useful 
in analyzing behavior in field environments or 
whether the experimental investigation should 
be moved to a field environment. Laboratory 
procedures are well suited for our purposes and, 
in fact, are likely required, given the nature of 
the inquiry.3 Because endowment effect theory 
3 We caution the reader to be aware of common mis-
understandings regarding the purposes of experimental 
research that lead to unhelpful views about the usefulness 
of laboratory experiments. When choosing an experimental 
environment (e.g., lab versus field experiments), the pur-
pose of the experiment becomes important. Two different 
purposes, parameter estimation and theory testing, call 
for different environments. If the question posed concerns 
measurement of a parameter, then the field could be the 
appropriate environment simply because the field might be 
the only environment in which the parameter confidently 
resides. For example, the field is appropriate if the intent is 
to measure the elasticity of market demand for a specified 
commodity or damages owed due to monopoly power or 
price-fixing schemes. A second and much different purpose 
of experiments, theory testing, must be recognized as a sub-
stantially different experimental activity. Relative to param-
eter measurement, theory testing is more naturally directed 
toward laboratory environments, especially in the case of 
very general theories, such as endowment effect theory. 
Theory testing requires that predictions of competing theo-
ries be clearly separated so the theory that best accounts for 
observed phenomena can be identified convincingly. Thus, 
depending on the theories, theory testing might require 
implementation of controls and replications under different 
sets of controls that are unimplementable in the field or 
have little resemblance to any field environment.
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posits a particular preference relation, testing it 
requires controls and measurements difficult or 
impossible to implement in the field. Indeed, the 
results reported by Knetsch are noteworthy pre-
cisely because he demonstrated the phenomenon 
in the laboratory in the absence of confounding 
variables present in naturally occurring envi-
ronments. By contrast, asymmetric choices 
observed in the field can result from a number 
of variables unrelated to a “kink” in the utility 
function at a reference point as postulated by 
endowment effect theory. In particular, value 
placed on an entitlement can be substantially 
influenced by the process through which enti-
tlement was acquired. For example, one might 
hesitate to trade a trophy awarded at the end of 
a competition for a physically identical trophy. 
In addition, the ability to thoroughly inspect 
a good in one’s possession can be a source of 
information about its properties that leads to an 
adjustment in valuation. Some of these potential 
influences are impossible to observe in the field, 
and any attempt to control them almost cer-
tainly will introduce the same procedural dif-
ficulties inherent in the laboratory. The absence 
of proper controls and the alternative theories 
thereby injected render unconvincing inferences 
drawn from observed patterns of data.
This is not to say that field experiments are 
impossible or cannot be helpful. On the contrary, 
imaginative experiments on asymmetric choices 
have been conducted in partial field environ-
ments (e.g., List 2004). While these experiments 
provide insights about theory robustness, they 
do not serve well as tests of competing theories. 
The problem is that observed asymmetries can-
not be attributed convincingly to endowment 
effect theory, given the existence of competing 
alternative theories related to uncontrolled field 
variables.4 Testing endowment effect theory 
4 For example, List (2003, 2004) finds that choice asym-
metries differ across subject pools, and attributes this differ-
ence to variation in experience. In particular, he posits two 
theories, which depend on whether subjects are choosing 
between unique goods or “everyday consumable goods.” 
In the case of unique goods, he theorizes that “experi-
enced subjects are more certain of their preferences” and 
thus “[l]esser-experienced agents may keep their endowed 
good simply to avoid making embarrassing mistakes” (List 
2004, 617). In the case of everyday consumable goods, he 
suggests that experience makes the subject more likely to 
view traded endowments as opportunity costs rather than 
against classical preference theory in the field 
with all controls needed to make a convincing 
case, while at the same time maintaining an 
unperturbed field environment, would add com-
plexities that likely would make it impossible to 
identify the theory at work due to the various 
extraneous forces triggered by entitlement cre-
ation. Fortunately, laboratory experimental pro-
cedures can be structured to test the predictions 
of competing theories more easily, given the 
ability to control the environment. By peeling 
away the previously unrecognized complexities 
and using several subtle variations of controls 
and replications that would be very difficult if 
not impossible to implement in the field, we are 
able to identify the theory that better explains 
observed exchange asymmetries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I 
provides background, including a recap of the 
design of, and results from, exchange experiments, 
losses (List 2004, 624). The results reported in the pres-
ent paper suggest other possible explanations for observed 
asymmetries in his experiments. For example List’s pro-
cedures allow for experimenter involvement in the choice 
of the endowed good, which, according to our results, can 
signal relative quality. Thus, our results, together with 
List’s results, can be interpreted as suggesting that behavior 
was driven by the combination of experience with trading 
together with reactions to subtle signals of relative qual-
ity. If experienced subjects are more confident in their own 
abilities to assess quality (no matter what the good), they 
might rely less on signals to update their beliefs about the 
quality of goods. In addition, a host of alternative theories 
can be derived from the fact that inexperience is known 
to operate along several different channels (e.g., see Plott 
1996), any one of which could lead to asymmetric choices. 
While List controlled several variables we identified as 
important, others left uncontrolled are potential explana-
tions of observed choices.
 One can formulate other candidate theories, based on 
various features of List’s experiments, to explain his obser-
vations. For example, to understand the actual effect of 
experience on the propensity to resist giving up endow-
ments, it seems important to rule out selection effects. It 
could be that those with higher levels of confidence in their 
own ability to judge the quality of goods trade more rela-
tive to those who have lower confidence levels. Therefore, 
the act of trading might do little to change the perception of 
the good in the eyes of the owner. Conducting experiments 
in the field makes it difficult, if not impossible, to control 
for selection effects. In the lab, however, subjects can be 
randomly assigned to different groups, some of whom gain 
experience during the experiment and some of whom do 
not. In general, the lab offers virtually unlimited opportu-
nities to control for a multitude of variables with the goal of 
identifying the theory that best explains the data.
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and provides evidence of the proliferation of the 
interpretation of exchange asymmetries as sup-
port for endowment effect theory in both the 
economics and law literatures. The prevalence 
of this particular interpretation prompted our 
investigation. Section II discusses particular pro-
cedures that might allow the operation of a vari-
ety of preference theories, which could explain 
observed exchange asymmetries. Endowment 
effect theory predicts that the presence of an 
endowment will result in reluctance to exchange, 
and therefore we should observe an exchange 
asymmetry in each of our five treatments. On 
the other hand, if procedure-driven theories 
such as signaling theory, other-regarding prefer-
ences, and information aggregation and cascade 
theory explain observed asymmetries, then dif-
ferences in experimental procedures will pro-
duce divergent results, even when the presence 
of an endowment is held constant across designs. 
Section III discusses the basic design features 
of our experiments and their results. We start 
with a set of baseline procedures, which reli-
ably produces exchange asymmetries. We then 
assess the influence of a collection of controls 
without establishing the independent influence 
of any particular control. Additional experi-
ments initiate an investigation of the effects and 
interdependencies of individual controls. The 
main result is that exchange asymmetries are 
not robust to changes in the procedures used to 
observe choices. Presence of an endowment is 
the one feature held constant across all experi-
ments; therefore, our results reject the claim 
that endowment effect theory explains observed 
asymmetries. Finally, Part IV concludes that our 
results, in combination with results from Plott 
and Zeiler (2005), strongly suggest that classical 
preference theories finding influence through 
procedures, as opposed to the structure of pref-
erences as postulated by prospect theory, explain 
observed exchange asymmetries. As such, our 
results call into question proposed legal policies 
that rely on interpretations of standard “endow-
ment effect” experiment results grounded in 
endowment effect theory.
I.  Background
Knetsch (1989) was the first to report results 
from exchange experiments to directly test the 
reversibility of indifference curves. The experi-
ments involved two groups of subjects. Each 
subject in the first group was given a mug 
and then asked to complete a questionnaire.5 
Following the questionnaire, the subjects were 
shown candy bars and told that they could each 
have one in exchange for the mug. The subjects 
were instructed to hold up a piece of paper with 
the word “trade” written on it if the candy bar 
was preferred to the endowed mug. To reduce 
transaction costs, the experimenter immediately 
executed all desired trades by taking candy bars 
to the subjects wishing to exchange. Using a 
second group of subjects, the same experiment 
was performed, except that each subject in this 
group was endowed with a candy bar and given 
an option to trade it for a mug.
The results were quite striking. Of the 76 sub-
jects endowed with mugs, 89 percent chose to 
keep the mug. The possibility that subjects simply 
preferred the mugs to the candy bars was ruled 
out by the fact that, of the 87 subjects endowed 
with candy bars, 90 percent chose to keep the 
endowed candy bar rather than exchange it for 
a mug. From these results, Knetsch concluded 
that subjects’ choices depended on their endow-
ments. He suggested that the dramatic asymme-
try resulted from subjects “[weighing] the loss 
of giving up their initial or reference entitlement 
far more heavily than the foregone gains of not 
obtaining the alternative entitlement” (Knetsch 
1989, 1279). In other words, he interpreted 
the observed behavior as resulting from loss 
aversion.6
Other researchers have obtained similar 
results using Knetsch’s design. William T. 
Harbaugh, Kate Krause, and Lise Vesterlund 
(2001) used simple exchange experiments 
with children to test whether market experi-
ence affects reluctance to trade, and found that 
observed exchange asymmetries were indepen-
dent of market experience levels. In addition, 
5 The questionnaire supposedly was devised as an 
instrument to allow the subjects a chance to “experience” 
entitlement of the endowed goods for a period of time, on 
the theory that such time would allow them to understand 
they were entitled to the endowed good.
6 In similar experiments designed to test the assump-
tion of transitivity of preferences, Knetsch (1992, 1995) 
obtained nearly identical results. Knetsch (1995) interprets 
these results as support for loss aversion and prospect the-
ory as well.
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List (2003, 2004) reports results from exchange 
experiments also designed to study whether 
market experience affects exchange asym-
metries. He found that subjects with market 
experience tend not to display exchange asym-
metries. For those without market experience, 
however, he observed a significant asymmetry 
in choices. Finally, Eric van Dijk and Daan van 
Knippenberg (1998) conducted exchange exper-
iments to test the effects of the comparability 
of consumer goods on the reluctance to trade. 
Subjects were “rewarded” with a bottle of wine 
(half one kind and half another) in exchange for 
participating in the study. Subjects were then 
allowed to trade with one another. The results 
suggest that subjects were reluctant to trade in 
general and were more reluctant to trade when 
they perceived substantial differences between 
the endowed good and the alternate good.
The results from these simple exchange exper-
iments have been interpreted by many as sup-
port for endowment effect theory, loss aversion, 
and/or prospect theory. Thaler (1980) interprets 
observed asymmetries from a variety of settings 
as resulting from prospect theory and loss aver-
sion. In particular, Thaler posits that the endow-
ment sets the reference point and that selling 
moves one in the direction of a loss and buy-
ing in the direction of a gain. To avoid losses, 
individuals state high values when asked how 
much they would be willing to accept to give 
up the endowment. Later Daniel Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) summarize the 
results reported by Knetsch (1989) and interpret 
the data as support for endowment effect theory 
(see also Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991, 
and Thaler 1992). They then argue that the data 
support prospect theory.7 
This interpretation of exchange experiment 
results has bled into legal scholarship as well. In 
separate experimental literature reviews, Russell 
Korobkin (2003) and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and 
Forest Jourden (1998) refer to Knetsch’s (1989) 
7 Werner Guth, Jan P. Krahnen, and Christian Rieck 
(1997), Gwendolyn C. Morrison (1998), Gretchen Chapman 
(1998), Nira Liberman et al. (1999), Leaf Van Boven, David 
Dunning, and George Loewenstein (2000), Stephen Wu 
(2001), Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2003), 
Gail Tom (2004), and Steffen Huck, Georg Kirchsteiger, 
and Jorg Oechssler (2005) also invoke Knetsch’s results as 
evidence of endowment effect theory, loss aversion, and/or 
prospect theory.
results as evidence of the existence of an endow-
ment effect. Jeffrey E. Stake (1995, 2001), Ian 
Ayres and Fredrick E. Vars (1998), Henry E. 
Smith (2000), and M. Gregg Bloche (2003) also 
use Knetsch’s results as evidence of the exis-
tence of an endowment effect (i.e., evidence for 
endowment effect theory) and/or support for 
loss aversion and prospect theory.8 More impor-
tantly, a number of legal commentators advance 
policy prescriptions that are, in part, responses 
to implications of endowment effect theory.9
It is important to note that several theories 
have been posited to explain WTP-WTA gaps 
and exchange asymmetries, and these theories 
should not be confused with endowment effect 
theory. As described, endowment effect theory 
holds that the utility function includes a “kink,” 
which leads to differing evaluations of gains and 
losses. That is, the gain from acquiring a good 
is less than the loss from giving up that same 
good. Endowment effect theory should not be 
confused with theories about the potential role 
of ownership in the creation of features of goods 
that hold special values, such as sentimental 
value, emotional attachment, familiarity, etc. 
These alternative theories posit that such sources 
of value are reflected in offers to sell (see, e.g., 
Cass R. Sunstein 1986, 1151; Thomas F. Cotter 
1997, 62; Cynthia R. Farina and Rachlinski 
2002, 605; and Lee Anne Fennell 2005, fn. 
107). That is, these theories describe owner-
ship as being associated with phenomena that 
transform the features of goods so that the good 
to be given up is not the same as the good that 
was acquired. These form what one might call 
“attachment theory,” which focuses on features 
that give special value to specific goods that, 
except for such features, are identical to alter-
native goods. It is important to note that such 
explanations are not the subject of endowment 
8 Other legal scholars have challenged the existence and 
stability of the endowment effect. See e.g., Christopher 
Curran and Paul H. Rubin (1995) and Jennifer Arlen 
(1998).
9 See, e.g., Rachlinski and Jourden (1998) (arguing that 
injunctive remedies, as opposed to damages remedies, 
impede trade because injunctions are perceived as endow-
ments, and right holders are resistant to giving up rights 
to which they are entitled due to the endowment effect) 
and Stake (2001) (arguing that the theory of loss aversion 
“provides a strong framework” for maintaining legal rules 
related to adverse possession).
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effect theory, which theorizes that the good and 
all features of the good are the same when buy-
ing and selling, but the kink in the utility func-
tion at a reference point creates an asymmetry in 
choices due to loss aversion.
II.  Experimental Procedures under  
Investigation
In this section, we elaborate on our conjec-
tures about why the experimental procedures, as 
opposed to endowment effect theory, are respon-
sible for observed asymmetries.
A. Method and Language  
Used to Endow Subjects
The specific method used to determine which 
good to endow and the language used to convey 
the method of determination might trigger pro-
cedure-driven explanations for observed asym-
metries. Specifically, whether subjects are told 
that the endowed good is chosen through some 
random process or whether they perceive it as 
being chosen by the experimenter might influ-
ence subject choices over goods. Both signaling 
theory and theories of other-regarding prefer-
ences suggest the importance of this seemingly 
innocuous procedure.
While the method used to determine and 
explain the endowment might influence sub-
ject choices in myriad ways unrelated to loss 
aversion, we offer two specific possibilities. 
First, the language typically used to convey the 
nature of the endowment might cause subjects 
to perceive the endowed good as a gift from the 
experimenter. For example, imagine that the 
experimenter, after distributing the endowed 
good, “X,” announces, “X is yours. You own X. 
I am giving X to you.”10 Subjects might perceive 
this language as indicating that X is a gift from 
the experimenter, even though the experimenter 
might simply intend to convey that subjects now 
10 While the exact language used by experimenters in 
previous experiments is often not reported, the descrip-
tion of the experiments suggests that subjects perceived the 
endowed good as a gift. For example, Knetsch (1989) indi-
cates that “76 were given a coffee mug,” and that “87 partic-
ipants in the second group were offered an opportunity to 
make the opposite trade of giving up a candy bar, which had 
been given to them initially … ” (emphasis added) (Knetsch 
1989, 1278). 
own X. Given this perception, subjects might 
hesitate to trade the “gift” for the alternate good 
in deference to the experimenter. In other words, 
rather than choosing between a simple mug and 
a simple pen, each subject is choosing between 
a mug, which was a gift from the experimenter, 
and a pen.11
Second, subjects might perceive the method 
used to determine the good chosen for the 
endowment as containing information. A subject 
who perceives the experimenter as exercising 
some judgment in determining which good to 
endow reasonably might view the experimenter 
as having special information about the relative 
value of the goods. The choice of the endowed 
good might serve as a signal about the relative 
value of the goods.12 By engaging in particular 
actions, the experimenter might unintentionally 
reveal what subjects perceive as information 
about the relative value of the endowment. A 
subject who is indifferent between the endowed 
good and alternate good, or has not thought 
much about the relative value of the goods, 
might base choices on a perceived signal and do 
so instinctively.
To test these alternative explanations, we 
employed two different procedures for deter-
mining which good to endow. The first proce-
dure focuses on language we suspect encourages 
the subjects to perceive the endowment as a gift. 
When the endowed goods were distributed, the 
experimenter announced, “I’m giving you X. 
It is a gift. You own it. It is yours.” The sec-
ond procedure was designed to convey that 
the determination of the endowment resulted 
from a random process—a process through 
which the experimenter exercised no judgment. 
Subjects were told that the endowed good was 
determined by a coin flip before the start of the 
experiment.13 If exchange asymmetries result 
11 We thank Richard Lazarus for pointing this out as a 
potentially important variable. Gertrud M. Fremling and 
Richard A. Posner (1999, 27) focus on a need for subject 
anonymity to avoid any public display of choices and any 
associated public signal of personal traits or attitudes. 
12 That subjects gather information by observing the 
actions of others is well established (see, e.g., Plott 2000). 
13 Specifically, subjects were told, “Before the start of 
the experiment, a coin was flipped to determine which 
good, the mug or the pen, to distribute. It came up heads, 
which means that we start with the mugs (or pens). The sub-
jects in the other room will start with the pens (or mugs).”
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from the involvement of the experimenter in 
determining the endowment, we should observe 
an asymmetry when employing the first proce-
dure but not the second. If, instead, loss aver-
sion explains observed asymmetries, we should 
observe an asymmetry regardless of the proce-
dure employed.
B. Suggestions of Relative Value
When conducting exchange experiments, 
experimenters have tended to incorporate pro-
cedures to establish a “reference point,” in this 
case, entitlement vis-à-vis the endowed good, 
prior to asking them to choose one of the goods. 
For example, subjects often are asked to fill 
out questionnaires while the endowed good is 
in front of them. Presumably, this is thought to 
provide subjects enough time to comprehend the 
endowed good as an entitlement.
A close examination of the procedures, 
however, reveals that experimenters, intent on 
emphasizing entitlement, possibly establish 
more than a reference point by inadvertently sig-
naling that the endowed good is more valuable 
than the alternate good. For example, empha-
sizing ownership (e.g., “This good is yours. 
You own it. It belongs to you.”) in an attempt to 
ensure that subjects comprehend the entitlement 
might signal to the subjects that it is more valu-
able than the alternate good. Alternatively, this 
sort of language might be interpreted as a signal 
from the experimenter that the “correct” choice 
is to keep the endowed good.
To test whether this feature of the procedures 
might lead to exchange asymmetries, we altered 
the standard procedures (i.e., those likely 
employed by Knetsch (1989)) in two ways. First, 
when we distributed the endowments, we simply 
said, “These X’s are yours.” This is in contrast 
to emphasizing entitlement by saying, “I’m giv-
ing you X. It is a gift. You own it. It is yours.” 
Second, the forms subjects used to communi-
cate their choices simply instructed, “Please 
circle the item you wish to take home with you.” 
The form included three choices: “X,” “Y,” and 
“I DON’T CARE.” This is in contrast to stating 
the choices as “I want to keep my X,” and “I 
want to trade my X for a Y.” If exchange asym-
metries are caused by experimental procedures 
that suggest relative value, then modifying such 
procedures potentially will have an impact on 
choices. On the other hand, if endowment effect 
theory explains exchange asymmetries, then 
these subtle changes in language should not 
affect choices, and asymmetries will persist.
C. Location of Endowed good at  
Time of Choice
Where the endowed good is located at the 
time subjects make their choices might influence 
their decisions. In standard exchange experi-
ments, the experimenter places the endowed 
good immediately in front of the subjects. As 
with other procedures analyzed previously, it 
could be that subjects perceive the position of 
the endowed good relative to the alternate good 
as a signal of relative value.
To control for this feature of the procedures, 
we altered the standard procedures in a simple 
way. After presenting subjects with the endowed 
good and allowing them to inspect it while 
completing the questionnaires, we replaced the 
endowed good with the alternate good (remind-
ing subjects that they maintained entitlement to 
the endowed good even though it was not sit-
ting in front of them). If exchange asymmetries 
are caused by signals of relative value produced 
by the location of the goods, then removing this 
sort of signal will influence exchange asymme-
tries (or result in reverse asymmetries). On the 
other hand, if endowment effect theory explains 
exchange asymmetries, then this change in pro-
cedures should not affect choices, and asymme-
tries will persist.
We constructed an additional treatment 
(referred to as the “transaction costs test”) to 
investigate a second conjecture about how the 
location of the endowed good might influence 
choices. Specifically, if a subject is indiffer-
ent between the endowed good and the alter-
nate good, even very slight transaction costs 
(e.g., requiring a subject to raise his hand if he 
wishes to trade or to take any sort of action to 
initiate a trade such as the physical exchange 
of the endowment for the alternate good) 
might encourage him to keep the good within 
reach. That slight transaction costs can influ-
ence choices when subjects are near indifferent 
is well known (Plott and Smith 1978). Indeed, 
Chapman (1998) speculated that some of her 
results were due to reluctance to trade because 
subjects were “truly indifferent between the two 
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items and trading involved transaction costs.” 
Many experimenters (e.g., Knetsch 1989) have 
incorporated procedures to eliminate (or at least 
reduce) transaction costs in an attempt to rule 
them out as a direct cause of observed asym-
metries (e.g., hand delivering the alternate good 
to subjects). Complete removal has proved diffi-
cult, however. Few, if any, have been able to con-
clude definitively that they are not an important 
driver of observed asymmetries.
We took a different approach to investigate 
whether transaction costs explain observed 
asymmetries. We used the standard proce-
dures except that we asked subjects to make 
choices while the alternate good, rather than 
the endowed good, was within their reach.14 If 
subjects are indifferent between the goods, and 
transaction costs make subjects reluctant to 
trade, we should observe a “reverse” asymmetry 
when subjects make choices while the alternate 
good is in front of them. Put simply, transaction 
costs will result in subjects keeping the alternate 
good rather than trading back for the endowed 
good. On the other hand, if endowment effect 
theory accounts for observed asymmetries, we 
should observe subjects trading to retrieve their 
endowed goods.15
D. Public Revelation of Choices
Signals as sources of information about value 
can enter through yet another aspect of the 
procedures typically employed in studies that 
report exchange asymmetries. In most reported 
exchange experiments, including Knetsch’s 
(1989) experiment, subjects are asked to raise 
their hands if they wish to trade the endowed 
good for the alternate good. The resulting public 
revelation of choices might cause a “cascade” of 
sorts; those who are contemplating choosing one 
good might observe, as hands begin to go up or 
stay down, that most others seem to prefer one 
good over the other. Public revelation of choices 
might trigger cascades if subjects view other 
14 See Section IIIB for specific procedures employed in 
the transaction cost treatment.
15 Of course, it could be that transaction costs and 
endowment effect theory, in combination with one another, 
make subjects reluctant to trade. If this is the case, then 
our results might provide evidence only about which effect 
overpowers the other in particular contexts. 
subjects’ decisions as signals about the goods’ 
relative value. That subjects interpret the choices 
of others as signals of value is well established 
(Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt 1997; 
Angela A. Hung and Plott 2001; Martin Barner, 
Francesco Feri, and Plott 2005).
To control the influence of public revelation 
of choices on behavior, we used forms to allow 
subjects to report their choices privately. This 
ensures that subjects’ choices are independent 
of other subjects’ choices. If exchange asym-
metries are due to the public nature of choice 
elicitation, then allowing subjects to communi-
cate their decisions privately should eliminate 
them. On the other hand, if endowment effect 
theory explains asymmetries, then the elicita-
tion mechanism should not significantly influ-
ence the results.
Section III reports results from five exchange 
experiments that implement various sets of the 
procedures discussed in Section II.
III.  Experiment Designs and Results
The experimental design reflects the study’s 
primary purpose: to investigate the possibility 
that classical preference theory working through 
certain procedures, as opposed to endowment 
effect theory, accounts for observed exchange 
asymmetries. To test this conjecture, we alter 
the design in an attempt to rule out procedure-
driven explanations. This is accomplished by a 
demonstration that asymmetries can be made to 
appear or disappear in a given subject pool by 
altering procedures while leaving the predic-
tions of endowment effect theory intact. That 
is, the test calls for a demonstration of a change 
in behavior suggested by other well-established, 
competing theories when endowment theory 
predicts no change in behavior.
Multiple competing theories such as signal-
ing or other-regarding preferences can work to 
influence choices through different procedures; 
therefore, we first test the alternative explanation 
by controlling simultaneously for all competing 
theories. If changes in procedures do not result 
in changes in choices, we can conclude that the 
data support endowment effect theory. On the 
other hand, if the results suggest that procedures 
influence choices, as is the case in the experi-
ments reported here, we can begin to explore 
the impact of subsets of procedures to establish 
VOL. 97 NO. 4 1457PLOTT ANd ZEILER: ExCHANgE ASyMMETRIES INCORRECTLy INTERPRETEd?
robustness of the initial result and to initiate a 
deeper investigation of the channels through 
which the procedural influences work.
Section IIIA reports results from two treat-
ments, which taken together demonstrate that 
controls affect choices. Endowment effect 
theory predicts we will observe an exchange 
asymmetry in both treatments studied given 
that entitlement is present in both. We observed 
an asymmetry, however, only in the treatment 
void of any experimental controls to rule out 
alternative explanations related to procedures. 
From this, we conclude that the classical prefer-
ence theories, and not endowment effect theory, 
account for observed exchange asymmetries.
Section IIIB reports a set of results that tests 
robustness of our initial results and moves us a 
step toward understanding the effects of indi-
vidual procedures and possible interactions 
between them. The analysis provides insights 
into not only which procedures (or combinations 
of procedures) seem to be driving differences in 
elicited choices, but also the alternative theo-
ries that might be at work. While endowment 
effect theory predicts asymmetries in all three 
treatments, we observe asymmetries in only one 
of the three treatments (when differences are 
measured at the 5 percent level). Table 1 sum-
marizes the features of each design. Table 2 pro-
vides details regarding each session conducted, 
including the date, person(s) who ran the experi-
ment, the subject pool, and the goods used. We 
also summarize the results for each session indi-
vidually in Table 2. We drew our subjects from 
pools of Caltech students and Georgetown law 
students.
A. Classical Preference Theories Explain 
Observed Exchange Asymmetries
We conducted two treatments to test for 
whether classical preference theories affect 
choices through the collection of procedures 
used to endow subjects and elicit their choices. 
The baseline treatment contains none of the 
controls we identified as important. The sec-
ond treatment incorporates a full set of controls 
meant to remove the influence of the alterna-
tive theories mentioned above. The data support 
the conjecture that classical preference theo-
ries, and not endowment effect theory, explain 
observed exchange asymmetries. Specifically, 
we observed a significant exchange asymme-
try when no controls are employed. When we 
control for all competing theories, however, the 
asymmetry disappears, contrary to what endow-
ment effect theory would predict.
A Baseline.—We first attempted to replicate 
the asymmetric exchange phenomenon that has 
been widely reported in the literature. We refer 
to this treatment as the “baseline” because it 
includes all procedures the alternative explana-
tions predict would lead to an observed asym-
metry. We employ the baseline procedures to 
demonstrate that we can observe asymmetries in 
our subject pools. This set of procedures serves 
as a backdrop against which we assess alterna-
tive procedures.
We distributed mugs branded with university 
insignia to the subjects (Caltech mugs to Caltech 
students and Georgetown mugs to Georgetown 
students) and informed the subjects that they 
owned the mugs by announcing, “I’m giving you 
the mug. It is a gift. You own it. It is yours.”16 
While the endowed goods were located in front 
of the subjects, we allowed them approximately 
three minutes to fill out questionnaires.17 After 
they completed the questionnaires, we allowed 
them to pass a few pens around the room so they 
could inspect them.18 Once each subject had an 
opportunity to inspect a pen, the experimenter 
instructed, “Please raise your hand if you want 
to keep the mug, the thing you own, rather than 
trading it for a pen.”19 The experimenter then 
walked around the room to make any necessary 
16 We obtained the mugs from campus bookstores for 
roughly $5 apiece. We removed the price tags from all 
goods prior to conducting the sessions.
17 Appendix A contains a typical questionnaire. Subjects’ 
answers to the questions were irrelevant to our study. We 
employed the questionnaires so that our results would be 
comparable to previously reported results. Each session 
lasted for less than ten minutes and subjects possessed the 
endowed good for about three to five minutes before mak-
ing their choices. This is roughly the same amount of time 
provided in other experiments of this kind.
18 We obtained the pens, labeled with the name of the 
subjects’ university, from campus bookstores for approxi-
mately $5 apiece. In one session, we used candy bars that 
were not labeled with the name of the university but cost 
roughly the same as the other goods. 
19 The standard procedures ask subjects to raise their 
hands if they want to trade the endowed good for the alter-
nate good. It seems reasonable to assume that a majority 
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exchanges. We conducted additional sessions 
using an identical design, except that subjects 
were endowed with pens instead of mugs.
We collected data from 129 Georgetown law 
students and Caltech students. We endowed 64 
subjects with mugs and 65 with pens. Eighty-
four percent of the mug owners chose mugs and 
28 percent of the pen owners chose mugs. A two-
sample, one-tailed test of equality of proportions 
with raised hands is easier to detect than a majority that 
remains with hands down. 
supports a rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the percentages are identical in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that the percentage of 
mug owners who chose mugs is greater than the 
percentage of pen owners who chose mugs (p 5 
0.00). In other words, these data reveal a statisti-
cally significant exchange asymmetry.
Full Set of Controls.—We refer to the second 
treatment as the “full set of controls” because we 
designed the procedures to remove all avenues 
of procedural influence listed in Section II. This 
treatment tests for the existence of procedural 
Table 1—Design Features and Continuum of Results 
(From no asymmetry to statistically significant asymmetry)
Full set of  
procedural controls
Loss emphasis  
test
Standard 
procedures
Transaction costs 
test
Baseline
procedures
Endowed good 
 immediately in 
front of subject at 
time of choice
NO YES YES NO YES
Experimenter chose  
and gave OR 
randomly assigned 
which good  
to endow
RANDOMLY 
ASSIGNED
RANDOMLY 
ASSIGNED
EXPERIMENTER 
CHOSE  
AND GAVE
EXPERIMENTER
CHOSE  
AND GAVE
EXPERIMENTER 
CHOSE  
AND GAVE
Experimenter  
purposefully and 
repeatedly empha-
sized ownership
NO NO YES YES YES
Choices made by  
public show of 
hands OR use of 
private forms
FORMS FORMS HANDS
(TRADE 
ENDOWED 
GOOD)
FORMS HANDS
(KEEP  
ENDOWED 
GOOD)
(# mug owners, 
# pen owners)
(69, 70) (44, 43) (44, 52) (53, 48) (64, 65)
(# mug owners who  
chose mugs, # pen 
owners who chose 
mugs)
(37, 47) (36, 32) (34, 32) (38, 24) (54, 18)
(Percent mug owners  
who chose mugs,  
percent pen owners  
who chose mugs)
(54 percent,  
67 percent)
diff 5 213 percent
(82 percent,  
74 percent)
diff 5 8 percent
(77 percent,  
62 percent)
diff 5 15 percent
(72 percent,  
50 percent)
diff 5 22 percent
(84 percent,  
28 percent)
diff 5 56 percent
Result† p 5 0.94‡ p 5 0.18 p 5 0.06 p 5 0.01 p 5 0.00
Notes. Overall, we observed a general preference for the mug. Of the 618 subjects that participated (including pilots), 398 
(or 64 percent) chose mugs. This is statistically significantly greater than 50 percent (p 5 0.00). This general mug prefer-
ence, however, does not affect our results as we measured asymmetries by comparing the percentage of mug owners who 
chose mugs and the percentage of alternate good owners who chose mugs. This measurement controls for the overall mug 
preference.
† Results are from two-sample tests of equality of proportions (null hypothesis: proportions are equal; alternate hypoth-
esis: percent mug owners who chose mugs . percent of pen owners who chose mugs).
‡ If we use an alternate hypothesis of Ha: percent of mugs owners who chose mugs , percent of pen owners who chose 
mugs, the p value is equal to 0.06. This (weakly) supports a hypothesis that a “reverse” asymmetry exists.
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the questionnaires were completed, we took 
the mugs from the subjects, placed them at the 
front of the room and distributed pens to the 
subjects. After providing time to inspect the 
pens, we asked each subject to decide which 
good to keep and to indicate the decision on a 
form.20 The forms simply indicated the options 
20 See Appendix C for a sample of the forms used during 
these sessions. We gave subjects an opportunity to indicate 
influences even though the exact nature of the 
influence might not be apparent.
We began these sessions by informing the 
subjects that mugs and pens would be used 
during the experiment. Subjects were then told 
that a coin was flipped before the start of the 
experiment to determine which good, the mug 
or the pen, would be distributed first. We then 
distributed mugs to the subjects and announced, 
“These mugs are yours.” Next, we asked the 
subjects to complete the questionnaires. After 
Table 2—Summary of Sessions
Date Experimenter Subject pool
Number of mug owners /
Number who chose mug
Number of alternative  
good* owners /
Number who chose mug
Full set of  
procedural  
controls
Jul 14 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 8 / 5 [1]** (63%) 9 / 5 [1] (56%)
Jul 15 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 6 / 4 [1] (67%) 7 / 4 [1] (57%)
Jul 26 04 RAs Gtown JD 10 / 6 [1] (60%) 5 / 2 [1] (40%)
Jul 27 04 RAs Gtown JD 5 / 4 [1] (80%) 5 / 4 [0] (80%)
Aug 03 04 RAs Gtown JD 9 / 1 [1] (11%) 18 / 12 [1] (67%)
Sept 20 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 17 / 8 [3] (47%) 14 / 11 [1] (79%)
June 21 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 4 / 2 [1] (50%) N/A
June 23 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 5 / 2 [0] (40%) 8 / 6 [2] (75%)
June 27 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 5 / 5 [0] (100%) 4 / 3 [1] (75%)
TOTAL 69 / 37 [9] (54%) 70 / 47 [8] (67%)
Loss  
emphasis  
test
Mar 30/Apr 3 06 Zeiler and RAs Gtown JD 8 / 5 (63%) 14 / 10 (71%)
June 12 & 14 06 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 12 / 10 (83%) 15 / 12 (80%)
June 13 & 15 06 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 24 / 21 (88%) 14 / 10 (71%)
TOTAL 44 / 36 (82%) 43 / 32 (74%)
Standard  
procedures
Sept 01 04 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 15 / 12 (80%) 30 / 18 (60%)
April 14 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 9 / 6 (67%) 11 / 9 (82%)
June 30 05 Zeiler and RAs Gtown JD 20 / 16 (80%) 11 / 5 (45%)
TOTAL 44 / 34 (77%) 52 / 32 (62%)
Transaction  
costs test
Jun 4 03 Zeiler Caltech UG 28 / 19 (68%) 28 / 14 (50%)
Jun 8 and 10 03 Zeiler Gtown JD 13 / 10 (77%) 10 / 5 (50%)
Jun 25 04 Zeiler Gtown JD 12 / 9 (75%) 10 / 5 (50%)
TOTAL 53 / 38 (72%) 48 / 24 (50%)
Baseline
procedures
Aug 2004 Plott and RA Caltech 9 / 7 (78%) 8 / 2 (25%)
Aug 18 04 Plott Caltech 7 / 5 (71%) N/A
Sept 9 04 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 17 / 14 (82%) 17 / 3 (18%)
April 26 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 8 / 7 (88%) 15 / 6 (40%)
June 17 05 Zeiler and RAs Gtown JD 8 / 8 (100%) 7 / 2 (29%)
June 29 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 8 / 7 (88%) 8 / 2 (25%)
July 10 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD N/A 10 / 3 (30%)
July 11 05 Zeiler and RA Gtown JD 7 / 6 (86%) N/A
TOTAL 64 / 54 (84%) 65 / 18 (28%)
* In each session except for the first session conducted on June 4, 2004, we used pens as the alternate good. During the first 
session, we used candy bars.
** The numbers enclosed in square brackets indicate the number of subjects who reported indifference between the two 
goods by circling “DON’T CARE” on the decision record (see Appendix C). The numbers in parentheses indicate the per-
centage of subjects who chose mugs.
SEPTEMBER 20071460 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
and did not reemphasize the fact that subjects 
owned one of the goods. Once each subject 
completed a form, the experimenter walked 
around the room to collect them and make any 
necessary exchanges. We conducted additional 
sessions using an identical design, except that 
subjects owned pens rather than mugs.
In Table 1 we report the features of, and 
results from, this treatment. We collected data 
from 139 Georgetown law students, 69 endowed 
with mugs and 70 endowed with pens. Fifty-four 
percent of the mug owners chose mugs and 67 
percent of the pen owners chose mugs. A two-
sample, one-tailed test of equality of proportions 
supports the hypothesis that the percentages 
are identical (p 5 0.94).21 In other words, we 
observed no exchange asymmetry under this set 
of procedures. Indeed, we observe a (somewhat 
weak) reverse asymmetry.22
These results, taken together, support the 
conjecture that exchange asymmetries result 
from classical preference theories working 
through the experimental procedures and can-
not be explained by endowment effect theory or 
prospect theory. The next section reports results 
from experiments designed to begin an explora-
tion of specific procedural effects and how pro-
cedures interact with one another.
B. Sets of Procedures and Their Interactions
Classical preference theories suggest several 
mechanisms through which any specific pro-
cedure might influence choices. Thus, we turn 
our investigation to whether specific procedures 
exhibit influence over choices. Using key proce-
dures as cornerstones, we begin an investigation 
into the effects of sets of specific procedures 
indifference between the goods by circling the option 
“DON’T CARE.” None of the subjects asked which good 
would be received upon choosing this option. Each subject 
who chose “DON’T CARE” received the good in her pos-
session at the time she completed the form. Only 17 of the 
139 subjects reported indifference; therefore, the results 
from statistical tests of differences of proportions are virtu-
ally identical when we include and exclude these data.
21 We tested the null hypothesis of equality against an 
alternative hypothesis that the percentage of mug owners 
who chose mugs was greater than the percentage of pen 
owners who chose mugs.
22 When the alternative hypothesis is framed as “the per-
centage of pen owners who chose mugs is greater than the 
allowing the influence of classical preference 
theories. This section reports the design features 
of these treatments and their results. Recall that 
endowment effect theory predicts asymmetries 
in each treatment. By contrast, we observe an 
asymmetry in only one treatment (when mea-
sured at the 5 percent level).
Transaction Costs Test.—The transaction 
costs test was designed to explore whether trans-
action costs created by procedures might explain 
observed asymmetries. That small transaction 
costs can create asymmetries in choices when 
individuals are nearly indifferent was estab-
lished in the 1970s (Plott and Smith 1978).
To test for the influence of transaction 
costs, we distributed mugs to the subjects and 
informed them that they owned the mugs. While 
the endowed good was located in front of them, 
subjects spent approximately three minutes fill-
ing out questionnaires. After they completed the 
questionnaires, we removed the endowed mugs 
and placed the mugs at the front of the room 
(reminding them that they still owned them) and 
passed around pens for their inspection. Each 
student then filled out a form to indicate whether 
he wanted to keep his mug or trade his mug for 
a pen (see Appendix B). Once the subjects com-
pleted the forms by choosing one of the options, 
the experimenter walked around the room 
to collect the forms and made any necessary 
exchanges. We conducted additional sessions 
using an identical design, except that subjects 
were endowed with pens instead of mugs.
We collected data from 101 Georgetown law 
students and Caltech students. We endowed 53 
subjects with mugs and 48 with pens. Seventy-
two percent of the mug owners chose mugs and 
50 percent of the pen owners chose mugs. A 
two-sample, one-tailed test of equality of pro-
portions supports a rejection of the null hypoth-
esis that the percentages are identical in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis that the percentage 
of mug owners who chose mugs is greater than 
the percentage of pen owners who chose mugs 
(p 5 0.01). In other words, these data reveal a 
statistically significant exchange asymmetry. 
This result suggests that any transaction costs 
percentage of mug owners who chose mugs,” a two-sample 
test of equality of proportions results in a p-value of 0.06.
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mugs. A two-sample, one-tailed test of equal-
ity of proportions (somewhat weakly) supports 
a rejection of the null hypothesis that the per-
centages are identical in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that the percentage of mug owners 
who chose mugs is greater than the percentage 
of pen owners who chose mugs (p 5 0.06). In 
other words, we observed a (somewhat weak) 
exchange asymmetry. The fact that the asym-
metry observed under the standard procedures 
is not as large as that under the baseline proce-
dures suggests that the existence of subtle sig-
nals might have an effect, but the effect is not 
sufficient to eliminate the asymmetry.25
Loss Emphasis.—This treatment addresses 
critiques of the “full set of procedural controls” 
treatment design and serves as another test of 
the robustness of our general results. Some have 
argued that the procedures embodied in the full 
set of controls might reduce the chance that 
subjects understand they actually are entitled to 
one of the goods, and therefore the full set of 
25 In a separate test, we investigated whether the order 
in which the experimenter presents the goods to the sub-
jects matters (see Harrison et al. (2005) for a general dis-
cussion of how order effects tend to confound results). We 
presented subjects with the alternate good before present-
ing them with the endowed good. During these sessions, 
we distributed mugs to the subjects and informed them 
that the mugs did not belong to them but that they should 
inspect them because we would give them an opportunity to 
obtain one later in the session. We then asked the subjects 
to complete the questionnaires. After the questionnaires 
were completed, we removed the mugs, placing them at the 
front of the room, and distributed pens to the subjects. Once 
each subject possessed a pen, the experimenter announced, 
“These pens are yours.” Subjects then completed forms to 
indicate whether they wanted to keep the endowed good or 
trade it for the alternate good. The experimenter walked 
around the room to collect the forms and make any neces-
sary exchanges. We conducted additional sessions using an 
identical design, except that the sessions started with pens 
rather than mugs.
 We collected data from 50 Georgetown law students. We 
endowed 17 subjects with mugs and 33 with pens. Seventy-
one percent of the mug owners chose mugs and 64 percent 
of the pen owners chose mugs. The proportions are not sta-
tistically significantly different (p 5 0.31; power 5 0.0675). 
This result differs from those obtained using the standard 
procedures; but the treatment changed both the public 
nature of the choice and the order of presentation. Since the 
effect is small relative to the “standard treatment,” but large 
relative to baseline, and because multiple variables are at 
work, we chose not to pursue this line of investigation. The 
question of order of presentation remains open.
that might exist in the baseline do not account 
for the observed exchange asymmetry.
This result suggests that transaction costs do 
not drive observed exchange asymmetries. In 
addition, when combined with the results from 
the treatment employing the full set of controls, 
this result suggests that removing the influence 
of classical preference theories by modifying the 
standard procedures (e.g., removing the experi-
menter from the determination of the endow-
ment, etc.) eliminated the exchange asymmetry 
under the full set of controls.23
Standard Procedures.—We refer to this 
design as “standard” because of its close prox-
imity to the procedures found in the literature. 
The procedures differ from the baseline only in 
terms of the meaning of raised hands during the 
choice phase of the experiment. In the baseline 
procedures, a subject’s raised hand signals the 
desire to keep the endowed good. In the stan-
dard procedures, a raised hand signals the desire 
to trade the endowed good for the alternate 
good.24 This natural robustness check might 
also provide insight into what sorts of signals 
subjects send to one another when they make 
public choices, and how these signals interact 
with other procedures. Our suspicion was that 
the baseline procedures would produce stronger 
cascades and exacerbate the asymmetry. If the 
collection of procedures encourages subjects to 
trade, as suggested by the alternative theories, 
then many subjects will raise their hands to 
trade, leading to cascades of other subjects rais-
ing their hands to trade.
In Table 1 we report the features of, and 
results from, this treatment. We collected data 
from 96 Georgetown law students. We endowed 
44 subjects with mugs and 52 with pens. 
Seventy-seven percent of the mug owners chose 
mugs and 62 percent of the pen owners chose 
23 It also suggests that the results obtained when imple-
menting the full set of controls are not driven by the fact 
that the endowed good is not in front of the subjects when 
they are choosing between the two goods. 
24 Of all the designs we study, the “standard procedures” 
design seems most similar to Knetsch’s (1989) procedures 
(hence the label). Knetsch (1989) does not include the 
exact language used to convey entitlement to the subjects. 
Therefore, our language (i.e., “I’m giving you the mug. It is 
a gift. You own it. It is yours.”) might not exactly match the 
language he used. 
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controls cannot test the influence of reference 
points on choices. In particular, some have sug-
gested that lack of possession of the endowed 
good at the time of choice and the brief mention 
of entitlement (e.g., “The mug is yours.”) are 
insufficient to ensure that subjects understand 
they are entitled to the endowed good. In effect, 
they argue that specific features of the full set 
of controls make endowment effect theory irrel-
evant because, if entitlement is absent, then no 
loss is contemplated when choosing between the 
goods.
To address this conjecture we altered the 
“full set of controls” treatment in three ways: 
(a) when endowing one of the goods, rather than 
saying, “The mug is yours,” we said, “The mug 
is yours. You own it.”; (b) the subjects made 
choices while in possession of the endowed 
good; and (c) the forms reiterated entitlement 
to the endowed good (see Appendix B).26 We 
altered the design in these ways to determine 
whether a lack of understanding of entitlement 
caused the null result in the “full set of controls” 
treatment, while being careful to eliminate pos-
sible experimenter signals of value.
In Table 1 we report the features of, and 
results from, this treatment. We collected data 
from 87 Georgetown law students. We endowed 
44 subjects with mugs and 43 with pens. Eighty-
two percent of the mug owners chose mugs and 
74 percent of the pen owners chose mugs. A 
two-sample, one-tailed test of equality of pro-
portions supports acceptance of the null hypoth-
esis that the percentages are identical (p 5 0.18). 
In other words, we did not observe an exchange 
asymmetry. That the result from this treatment 
is consistent with the result from the “full set 
of controls” treatment suggests that a lack of 
understanding of entitlement does not explain 
the absence of an exchange asymmetry under 
the full set of controls.
In sum, it is important to stress that, while 
procedures clearly have a strong influence on 
the asymmetry of choices, any inferences about 
how particular features of the procedures affect 
choices are only conjectures at this stage. Given 
26 In most sessions, the forms said, “I want to keep my 
mug,” and “I want to trade my mug for a pen.” In the ses-
sions conducted on March 30, 2006, and April 3, 2006, 
however, we used forms that said, “I want to keep the mug,” 
and “I want to trade the mug for a pen.” 
our results, we suspect that interaction effects 
exist between various procedures and the infor-
mation contained in Table 1 is insufficient to 
understand what role each of them plays in 
influencing choices. One thing is clear, however: 
our results demonstrate that endowment effect 
theory cannot explain observed asymmetries.
IV.  Discussion and Conclusions
Many have advanced observed exchange 
asymmetries as support for endowment effect 
theory and underlying prospect theory. These 
are very general theories about the nature of 
preferences, which, if accepted, have implica-
tions for applied economics in complex field 
settings. While we do challenge the general 
accuracy of endowment effect theory, we do 
not challenge prospect theory, which has been 
explored in different experiments. More spe-
cifically, we challenge the interpretation of 
exchange asymmetries as providing empirical 
support for either endowment effect theory or 
prospect theory. Knetsch’s (1989) discovery of 
asymmetries in exchange experiments is inter-
esting and certainly should not be dismissed, 
but our results suggest that his discovery can-
not be explained by endowment effect theory. 
The experiments we report, along with those 
reported by others, suggest that classical prefer-
ence theories influencing choices through pro-
cedures used in the experiments account for the 
patterns of observed choices.
Well-established classical preference theories 
suggest the mechanisms through which the pro-
cedures influence choices to produce observed 
exchange asymmetries. Intuitions derived from 
them are based on two broad classes of variables. 
First, other-regarding preferences, specifically 
the regard subjects have for the experimenter, 
might influence choices in exchange experi-
ments. These preferences are known to operate 
during experiments and, in the case of exchange 
experiments, could be activated by aspects of 
procedures that might ingratiate the subject vis-
à-vis the experimenter (e.g., gift language). This 
theory is related to theories that hold that the 
context in which entitlement is granted gener-
ates an independent source of value and that 
value accounts for observed exchange asymme-
tries as opposed to loss aversion.
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are to be interpreted as strong evidence of the 
principles that operate when individuals make 
choices, then such asymmetries should be robust 
against subtle features of procedures and varia-
tions in the set of procedures used to conduct 
experiments.
In closing, we call the reader’s attention to a 
common interpretation mistake. It is tempting 
to interpret our results as demonstrating that 
the endowment effect is context-dependent. 
Specifically, some have argued that our results 
demonstrate that, in some contexts, individuals 
operate under utility functions with shapes sug-
gested by prospect theory, and, in others, they 
do not. Previous claims of this sort abound in 
the literature and represent a tendency to rec-
oncile results that do not support endowment 
effect theory by pointing to various contextual 
features.27 This “context-dependent” interpre-
tation places a very awkward strain on endow-
ment effect theory in an effort to find support for 
it. Consider a typical example of context-created 
value: a good received as a gift from a friend. 
Value is created by the context because, as a 
gift from a special individual, it is unique and 
thus valued differently from otherwise identical 
goods. Such values reflect special attributes of 
the good created by the context, and might be 
consistent with some form of attachment theory, 
but are unrelated to loss aversion, a key property 
of endowment effect theory. The strain results 
from the fact that one does not need to resort to 
a “kink” in a utility function to explain observed 
asymmetries in such contexts. Furthermore, 
such context-dependent theories destroy the 
generality and robustness of the theory, which is 
the source of power and relevance of any theory 
in applied work. Attempting to add to the theory 
various features of the context renders it impos-
sible to reject.
27 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer, and Eric 
L. Talley (2002, 4) (“Existing evidence on the endowment 
effect suggests that it is pronounced in certain circumstances 
yet muted (or absent) in others. Much like other deviations 
from rational choice, the existence and magnitude of the 
endowment effect is context dependent.”); Korobkin (2003, 
1235) (“The broad array of experiments testing the endow-
ment effect demonstrates that the effect is robust across 
different types of endowments, but it is not universally 
apparent nor equally striking across contexts.”) 
Second, signals built into the experimenter’s 
actions and language choices (or the actions 
of others) in combination with the possibility 
of asymmetric information about the relative 
value of the goods might influence choices. 
Subjects might interpret experimenter empha-
sis on entitlement as indicating that the experi-
menter has information about the relative value 
of the goods that the subjects do not. Similarly, 
the choices of others might be interpreted as 
reflections of private information about the 
relative value of the goods. Such influences are 
well known in the information aggregation and 
cascade literature.
It is important to note that our results demon-
strate much more than the possibility that arbi-
trary changes in procedures might influence 
subject choices. Classical preference theory is 
consistent with the pattern of results. The exper-
imental economics literature has demonstrated 
that other-regarding preferences and various 
signals about the relative value of the goods can 
influence choices. By implementing procedures 
that collectively control for the various routes of 
influence classical preference theories suggest, 
a substantial difference in choice behavior is 
observed under the full set of controls (when we 
neutralize these influences) and the treatments 
implementing the standard and baseline proce-
dures (when we do not control for these influ-
ences). Our results remain strong in robustness 
checks, which attempt to ensure that subjects 
understand their entitlement to the endowed 
goods while avoiding signals that might act 
as sources of information about relative value. 
The results from the transaction costs treatment 
suggest that the transaction costs variable does 
not explain a significant portion of the variation 
observed across treatments, even when clas-
sical preference theory suggests it might. We 
hasten to add that our understanding of proce-
dural influences is incomplete but our general 
conclusion stands: endowment effect theory 
does not seem to explain observed exchange 
asymmetries.
While gaps occasionally are observed, our 
results demonstrate that observed gaps are 
inconsistent with endowment effect theory. 
Either no “endowment effect” of the sort pre-
dicted by prospect theory exists or the effect is 
sufficiently weak that other phenomena easily 
swamp it. If asymmetries of observed choices 
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Appendix A
A Sample Questionnaire
1. The current U.S. Secretary of State is ______________________________________________ .
 How likely is it that your answer is correct? _____________________________________ percent
 (enter likelihood between 0 percent and 100 percent)
2. Bucharest is the capital city of  ____________________________________________________ .
 How likely is it that your answer is correct? _____________________________________ percent
 (enter likelihood between 0 percent and 100 percent)
3. The author of the novel The Phantom of the Opera is __________________________________ .
 How likely is it that your answer is correct? _____________________________________ percent
 (enter likelihood between 0 percent and 100 percent)
4. The actor ________________________ plays the U.S. President on the TV series The West Wing.
 How likely is it that your answer is correct? _____________________________________ percent
 (enter likelihood between 0 percent and 100 percent)
5. What does the acronym NASA stand for? ____________________________________________
 How likely is it that your answer is correct? _____________________________________ percent 
 (enter likelihood between 0 percent and 100 percent)
Appendix B 
Sample Transaction Record for Transaction Costs Test
Transaction Record*
u I want to keep my mug.
u I want to trade my mug for a pen.
*This form was used in sessions in which we endowed subjects with mugs. Subjects were asked to check one box. Similar 
forms, with obvious modification, were used in sessions in which we endowed subjects with pens.
Appendix C 
Sample decision Record for Sessions Using Full Set of Procedural Controls 
Decision Record
Please circle the item you wish to take home with you.
MUG                 PEN
DON’T CARE
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